Burmese Online Information Landscape Report No. 3

Full Report

Reporting Period

April - June 2023

Executive Summary

As part of an ongoing project aiming to promote tolerance and social cohesion in Myanmar, Digital Public Square has conducted a pilot study on the online information landscape in the country. Through a mixed-methods approach, this third report tracks and analyzes prevalent pro-regime mis and disinformation narratives and provides a high level overview of important topics and events in the online space, during the observed reporting period (1 April 2023 - 30 June 2023). This is the third report produced as a result of this pilot.

Table of Contents

About this Report 

Narratives Catalog

Methodology

Findings & Analysis

Codified Content of Pro-Regime Telegram Channels

Methodology

Findings & Analysis

Targeted Stakeholder Analysis

Methodology

Findings & Analysis

Key Takeaways

About this Report

As in almost every society today, social media plays an important role in Myanmar’s political culture. Even prior to the military coup in 2021, the use of printed media in Myanmar had already been on decline, as more and more people adopted online media to consume information and news over the traditional media outlets. Unsurprisingly, this trend accelerated in the aftermath of the coup, as printed editions of independent media - which were already struggling to survive - were halted by the military coup. Other forms of physical space for public discourse and free expression, such as public meetings, panel discussions, demonstrations, and even political discussions at tea shops, were sabotaged by brutal repression campaigns by the military, including arbitrary arrests and the confiscation of property.

With the demise of that physical space, the online information landscape has become even more relevant. The information has also been decentralized not only at the consumer end but also at the producer's end. The influx of information and its nature put an even heavier burden on independent media and civil society to verify and counter malicious information online. Against these backdrops, media channels on Telegram also increased, which quickly became an epicenter of the military's misinformation campaigns. To better understand the information pollution occurring across the Burmese information landscape, DPS launched a pilot study, consisting of four quarterly reports covering from October 2022 to August 2023.^[1] The pilot study will aim to provide a longitudinal review of the shifting information landscape in the country through a series of reports. The report’s mixed-methods approach consists of three research tracks: i) cataloging  refuted mis/disinformation narratives online, ii) codifying of content in pro-military Telegram channels, and iii) targeted stakeholders analysis via CrowdTangle. The combination of these methodologies offers diverse insights into important trends and issues related to Myanmar’s online information landscape.

Who we are

Digital Public Square is a Canadian not-for-profit organization that aims to serve communities-in-need with good technology. Our work has grown to reach millions of people worldwide across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Digital Public Square has been engaged in Myanmar since November 2019, on a program that seeks to increase tolerance and inclusion for religious and ethnic minorities. We work closely with multiple local partners and experts in the country, adapting to the dramatically dynamic environment.

Narratives Catalog 

The study of the narratives of military mis- and dis-information is a crucial part of this report. Flourishing of the Facebook endeavors to crackdown dis-information and hate speech in Myanmar coincided not just with the coup d’état in February 2021 but also with the beginning of public use of Telegram following the coup. Facebook was officially banned by the military shortly after the coup.^[2] Additionally, the widely used instant messaging platform Messenger was not considered secure enough anymore for users in the light of increased surveillance of the internet by the military. Against that backdrop, attempts have been made to fill the information gap to keep people informed of the events unfolding at a very dynamic rate and to mobilize people online. Telegram and Signal began to be trailed among pro-democracy activists and opposition circles because they both provide encrypted messaging service. After a while, Telegram stands out from the duo since it accommodates the functions of both Facebook and Messenger: a social networking platform (with limited functionalities) and an instant messaging service. Both platforms became widely used in a short period of time. Other functions beyond instant messaging service were explored and utilized quickly. Channels were first used to create open source scout platforms to inform those who are concerned about the security force’s movements and sizes. Virtual neighborhoods were created only on the basis of townships and shared security related updates in the groups and channels. Subsequently, the military also started using it to compensate for its online communities being banned on Facebook as part of its anti-hate speech and misinformation efforts.

Now we are into the 3rd year of military control in Myanmar, the military’s or its affiliated channels on Telegram enjoying substantial follower counts ranging from several thousands to forty thousands. The purpose of this study is to explore the narratives underlying the military’s mis- and dis-information campaigns mostly on Telegram, but to a much lesser extent on Facebook. Rather than tracking, mapping channels, groups and accounts, this stream of research deals with exploring generalizable trends and outliers in the contents of the mis- and dis-information that we captured and cataloged. The inquiry, consequently, does not include the extent to which the mis- and dis-information efforts from different sources are being coordinated.

Methodology

This research track aims to collect quantitative data on the nature and frequency of false narratives being circulated online. To do so, we compiled a list of 10 online accounts (see Appendix) that consistently identify and counter false information in the Burmese online environment. We then review, catalog and categorize the instances of false information that have been debunked via these selected research accounts. This approach relies on the reliable research conducted by fact-checker sites and organizations already operating in this space, and aims to provide a quantitative lens to these efforts. For this quarter, we cataloged 90 instances of false information published in the April-June 2023 period.

Findings & Analysis

Targets of Disinformation

After gathering 90 instances (30 per month) for the third reporting period, these instances are coded first according to the target of these. Target here denotes not the potential audience but the entity or the individual which is attacked or discredited by each instance of misinformation.

In this reporting period (April to June 2023), the collective of NUG/PDF/CRPH/NUG is broken down into separate entities, unlike the previous reporting period. The rationale behind is that by breaking down the collective, which has been by far the largest target of misinformation campaigns, and by treating the entities separately, we could explore the continuities and changes of these campaigns in a more precise fashion. With this new approach to cataloging, we observed that certain actors in this group cluster were targeted far more frequently than the rest.  

Of the total 90 instances of misinformation that we cataloged in this period, 51 targeted the People Defense Forces (PDF), accounting for over half (56%) of the total instances. Naturally, the misinformation instances are created often with more than a single target to undermine. In 41 instances, the PDFs were the sole targets. In the rest of the instances, they were attacked along with certain other entities, including the ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) (6 instances) and the National Unity Government (NUG) (2 instances).  

The second most targeted group of the misinformation instances cataloged was the EROs. The ethnic resistance organizations, as we treated a number of such organizations generically, are targeted a total of 15 times. Since we use it as an umbrella term, there are in fact different organizations which are targeted by these 15 instances. To provide a sense of how often each entity is targeted, the Karen National Union (KNU/KNLA) is targeted 5 times and the Chin National Front (CNF), the Arakan Army (ULA/AA), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO/KIA) and Kawthoolei Army (KTLA) are targeted 2 times each.

Closely following the EROs, the National Unity Government (NUG) is targeted 12 times by the pro-military misinformation campaigns. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) was targeted only once and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was not once targeted. Key revolutionary figures, another collective term to include important leaders of resistance, and the National League for Democracy (NLD), Aung San Suu Kyi’s party are targeted 4 times each while Aung San Suu Kyi herself was attacked once. The people in the civil disobedience movement were targeted 3 times and Myanmar’s muslim minority were targeted once.

A new target category which was introduced this quarter is independent media. A trend, despite its significance that we have been monitoring, is the pro-military telegram channels falsely rebuffing news reported by independent media. The trend is documented in this quarter and we found 8 such instances.

Given the PDFs and EROs are still the primary targets of the military’s misinformation campaign, it is evident that the pro-junta misinformation efforts keep their focus on the military opponents. As a result of treating NUG/CRPH/NUCC/PDF entities this quarter, we found that the attack on CRPH and NUCC may not be as significant as we thought looking at the findings from the past quarters.

Actors and Actions

The second method of categorization in our methodology is to sort the instance according to the actors which appear and their connections. Figure 3 visualizes these ‘actors and actions’ which are captured in this reporting period. Through coding and analysis actors and how they relate in these instances, we aim to understand more about the narratives which the disinformation campaigns are designed to push forward. As can be seen in the figure, connections, or ‘actions’ include perpetration, affiliation, or assistance. Sometimes there is just one actor in an instance and the following phrase describes its situations, for example, being in trouble.

These narratives are generally divided into two groups based on their frequencies. Those with repeated supporting instances are grouped as significant trends and those with low frequencies as outliers. It should be noted that although the narratives with high frequencies reflect the military’s major narratives, outliers should not be altogether ignored but should be observed and monitored closely. While looking at the analysis below, it would be helpful to keep in mind that the numbers of instances supporting different narratives are not exclusive to each other but indeed they sometimes overlap since a single narrative can be designed to support more than one narrative.

Significant Trends

The most important trend in the previous quarter is still the most important narrative supported by the pro-junta misinformation campaigns in this reporting period. The most frequently supported narrative is that the People Defense Forces (PDFs) are perpetrating against the Burmese population. While there was a significant increase in the number of instances that support the narrative in the last quarter, this reporting period saw a slight decrease in the number of such instances, from 33 to 27. Nevertheless, this is still the most significant narrative accounting for 30 percent of the total number of instances cataloged. Most common individual instances include PDFs burning down houses in villages; keeping people hostages; and killing people.

Another narrative that is second most frequently observed in this quarter is that the PDFs are in trouble. Out of a total of 90 instances, that narrative accounts for 7 instances. Individual instances portray that the PDF soldiers are running away from their posts; contacting the junta forces to give up arms; and having difficulties raising funds for their war efforts. While the number of instances is the same as the previous quarter, the narrative became the second most frequent one.

Other popular narratives in these instances are that the PDFs and the EROs are associates in crime (6 instances); that the EROs are perpetrating against the people; that the junta is winning against the PDFs; that the NUG is manipulating the people and that the EROs are in trouble (5 instances each). While the NUG and PDFs are working together in a number of domains such as their military efforts and being dialogue partners, the pro-junta misinformation campaigns portray them as partners in crime. These fabricated instances center around the areas where the fighting is intense between the ERO/NUG joint forces and the junta forces. The instances that portray that the EROs are perpetrating against the people and that they are in trouble use similar plots to the ones which attack the PDFs. The instances saying that the NUG is manipulating the people include that the NUG organized a misinformation campaign; that the NUG manipulated a list of victims of a junta’s airstrike.

Another important trend that we have been following this quarter is discrediting the independent media (6 instances). While many of such instances are not targeted against a single media agency, a narrative is being developed through these instances that the information reported by Myanmar independent media is not credible. Examples include claiming that civilian casualties reported by the media are overtly exaggerated; that the supposedly civilian victims of junta’s atrocities are in fact military targets such as PDFs and the EROs.

Other less prevalent narratives include that the NUG is perpetrating against the people; that certain foreign actors condemn the NUG; and that people who are in the civil disobedience movement (CDM) are helping the junta (2 instances each). By comparing the data from the last quarters, the trends are by and large following those in the previous quarter with narratives focusing on portraying military opponents, the PDFs and the EROs, as perpetrators and that they are losing the war against the junta.  

Outliers

Apart from these significant trends above, a number of less frequent narratives (1 instance each) were also observed in this reporting period. In this session, findings which are worthy of monitoring yet are different to the above narratives in nature will be discussed. The first one is that the PDFs and EROs are perpetrating against the EROs. While the propaganda efforts are focused on portraying the junta as the guardian of the religion, the PDFs and EROs are often portrayed to the opposite effect, although to a lesser extent than the above narratives.

Other outliers include that Muslim minority in Myanmar are happy that so many people are experiencing violence; that PDFs are perpetrating against the other revolutionary forces; and that ceasefire negotiations between the junta and the EROs in the Northern Alliance are successful.

Figure3: Frequency of narratives cataloged from research accounts | April - June 2023

Codified Content of Pro-Military Telegram Channels

Methodology

In parallel to the methodology described above, we also employed a pilot approach which would aim to sample, categorize and analyze content from public pro-military Telegram channels. This research offers qualitative coding of extracted data from selected Telegram channels, and aims to provide a qualitative textual analysis on the type of hate speech, misinformation and propaganda narratives being circulated on the pro-military channels. For this small pilot study, the research focused on six pro-military Telegram channels all of which were public and had over 10,000 followers. Some channels originally observed in the first and second reports were no longer available and consequently for this report, we have introduced one new channel for our analysis.

Given that the size of the Telegram channels and the frequency of posting varied from channel to channel, the study codified a random sample of 500 posts per channel, which was well above the minimum sample size calculated. The study analyzed 500 random posts from each Telegram channel, published sometime between 1 April 2023 and 30 June 2023. This random sampling was then categorized and analyzed to provide the insights below. While this pilot is relatively small, only focusing on 6 channels, we aim to provide qualitative insights into the key narratives, trends and their objectives within and across the observed  pro-military channels.

Findings & Analysis

Based on our analysis of the reporting period April - June 2023, the misinformation and mal-information campaigns continued to proliferate in the pro-military channels. We have found that the mal-information campaigns, that consist of doxing and unwarranted accusations, have become more pronounced in this period, with an alarming 1 in 3 posts containing mal-information (see Figure 4). Out of the analyzed 3000 samples, we found that at least 1.3% of the posts harbored misinformation, denoting 40 separate instances of attempts to mislead the public in significant cases. While this figure may appear low compared to the initial reporting period, it underscores a relentless effort by the pro-military telegram channels to propagate false narratives, echoing the trends and tactics we outlined in our previous reports. The proportion of negative sentiment expressed in each telegram channel could be found in Figure5.

In this report, while preserving the analytical continuity established in our preceding reports, we intend to delve deeper into the nuanced themes and tactics deployed by the pro-military telegram channels, which we also observe to some extent on other media platforms. Through this approach, we aim to provide more in-depth qualitative insights for our readers, thereby augmenting the depth of scrutiny applied to these content, without compromising the integral coherence across our series of analyses. Consequently in our third report, we distinguish the ‘themes and tactics’ prevalent in the pro-military telegram channels into three distinct categories:

1. Crafting a narrative of normalcy and the regime’s apparent victory

2. Perpetrating gender and sexual orientation-based defamatory attacks and insults

3. Utilizing race and religion to instigate communal tensions within the public and portray the pro-democracy fractions as enemies of race and religion.

Crafting a narrative of normalcy and the regime’s apparent victory

In our qualitative analysis, a recurring theme of the pro-miltiary telegram channels is their carefully orchestrated campaign to portray a facade of normalcy and the triumph of the military regime, as a tactic to strengthen the regime's grip and enhance its perceived legitimacy. Through a mixture of misinformation and disinformation strategies, these pro-military platforms present an image of a population going about their daily lives unaffected, particularly spotlighting instances during the Thingyan festival period (as could be seen in left side of  figure 3). Furthermore, a recurring narrative being peddled is the portrayal of the PDFs as the perpetrators of unrest and violence against a purportedly peaceful populace, a narrative of which could be seen on the right side of  Figure 6. 

In our identified instances of misinformation (see figure 7 for confirmed instances of misinformation in the sample of each telegram channel),  we have also found that pro-miltiary channels are disseminating unfounded stories of PDF forces surrendering and death, often resorting to the use of digitally manipulated pictures and videos as 'proof'. In Figure 7^[3] for example, Channel C spread mis-information with regards to the assassination of a revolutionary figure, which was later confirmed not to be true. This tactic is multi-faceted: creating videos that disseminate damaging narratives, crafting visuals that mockingly portray assaults on notable pro-democracy and revolutionary figures, and circulating baseless claims about the PDF, all seem to be part of the playbook. Disturbingly, the third quarter saw a surge in the posting of graphic images of deceased individuals, a grim testament to the lengths they are willing to go to maintain their narrative. This approach crafts a disconcerting tableau of a regime desperately trying to affirm its dominance, while systematically attempting to erode the spirit and unity of the pro-democracy movement.

Perpetrating gender and sexual orientation-based defamatory attacks and insults

In our recent analysis, a disturbing trend has emerged that extensively utilizes gender and sexual-based negativity as a tool to undermine the revolutionary movement. Our negative sentiment analysis of the period April-June 2023 highlights that an alarming 9.2% of the negative posts were exclusively targeted at women (see Figure 9). Additionally, women were disproportionately affected by doxxing incidents, constituting 32.6% of the targeted individuals (see Figure 9). This period saw a notable increase in instances where women and members of the LGBTQ community faced intensified targeted attacks, encompassing harassment and insults that revolved around their gender and sexual orientation.

Prominent and outspoken women often find themselves at the epicenter of these aggressive campaigns. These attacks are multifaceted, including defamatory statements and false scandal allegations aimed at those suspected to be supporting the revolution (see Figure 10 for instance). The channels we analyzed are full of content laden with discriminatory language that targets gender and sexual orientation, utilizing derogatory terms that are traditionally directed at women and the LGBTQ community. This strategy is used as a means to demean and disparage prominent figures of the revolution.

In Figure 11^[4], Channel D was mocking the attack of PDF forces using derogatory slurs against gays and women. Alarmingly, this narrative often transpires into harsh realities on the ground where individuals, particularly women and members of the LGBTQ community, are subjected to sexual violence upon arrest. This deliberate strategy of leveraging gender and sexuality-based slander is not just a blatant violation of human rights, but also serves as a sinister ploy to undermine the unity and morale of the pro-democracy revolutionary groups.

Utilizing race and religion to instigate communal tensions within the public and portray the pro-democracy fractions as enemies of race and religion

Another alarming prevalent theme in the content of the pro-military channels we have analyzed is the utilization of race and religion as potent tools to foster division and instigate communal tensions. A notable aspect of this troubling strategy adopted by pro-military channels is the propagation of insinuations and false narratives hinting at the dominance of non-Bamar leadership within the NUG, a sentiment exacerbated by emphasizing the Kachin ancestry of the interim president of the NUG. These calculated narratives suggest a perilous connection to heightened aggression incited by the KIA, implying that the PDF forces are consciously assaulting the Bamar population, potentially under the mentorship and training of KIA and other non-Bamar ethnic groups. This fabricated narrative seems engineered to ignite ethnic tensions, particularly fostering enmity between the Kachin and Bamar communities in the Sagaing region, portraying the Bamar populace as victims due to collaborations between PDF and KIA (see Figure 3 for example). This strategy is also seen in Karen state where the collaborations between PDF and KNU are strong.

We also see similar misinformation and disinformation campaigns with regards to the situation in Rakhine state with the pro-military channels making baseless claims that there is collaboration between the Arakan Army (AA) and entities in Bangladesh (see Figure 14). Accompanying these claims is the use of racially discriminatory language targeted at both AA and Rohingya individuals, designed to exacerbate the ethnic tensions further in Rakhine state.

Furthermore, religion has been brought prominently into the fray, widely using the narrative, noted in our second report, that suggests Buddhism is being undermined by the revolutionary forces. This tactic strategically positions the military regime as a purported guardian of race and religion, a narrative engineered to sow seeds of mistrust and conflict within the already fragmented socio-political landscape. In Figure 15^[5], the channel J outrageously claimed that the actors Chit Thu Wai, a Christian, and Paing Phyo Thu, a Muslim, are trying to destroy the Thingyan, a Burmese Buddhist cultural tradition and alarmingly called for sexual violence against these actors with disturbing language. This strategy, disturbing in its manipulation of sensitive ethnic and religious chords, seeks to undermine the solidarity and progress made by the pro-democracy revolutionary factions who have declared their commitment to establish a ‘federal democratic union’.

Targeted Stakeholder Analysis

Targeted Stakeholder Analysis is a monthly review of content posted by key stakeholders in the Burmese online environment. The purpose of this monthly monitoring activity is to get a high level view of the social media landscape in Myanmar, with a particular focus on discourse related to the coup and resistance movements.

Methodology

The Facebook pages of relevant stakeholders have been categorized into 3 groups: Myanmar Media (30 pages), Ethnic Media (33 pages), and Key Political Groups and CSOs (28 pages). The full list of pages can be found in the Appendix.

These lists were carefully curated in CrowdTangle to capture diverse opinions and priorities from different stakeholders in Burma, and to ultimately explore the most popular posts from the different stakeholder groups. For the third reporting period, from April to June 2023, we cataloged a total of 180 posts, 20 posts from each stakeholder group per month. This analysis provides quantitative insights into online discourse on Facebook in Myanmar, and through monthly tracking and analysis  we aim to reveal changes and trends in Myanmar’s digital information landscape. Among a number of criteria of the popularity of posts on Crowdtangle, we chose to use ‘Overperforming’ as our criteria to rank the posts. Unlike ‘Total Interaction’ which ranks posts according to their absolute number of interactions, thereby disproportionately representing the most popular pages, ‘Overperforming’ ensures the inclusion of less popular pages by numerous stakeholders.^[6] In this study, 180 overperforming posts were cataloged and reviewed. After gathering posts from Crowdtangle, each post is coded according to their ‘categories’ and ‘relevant actors’. Category(ies) of a post refers to general themes that the post is related to and the relevant actors are the prominent institution or individuals which are directly or indirectly referred to in the post. Coding the collected posts in these ways allows us to see the most popular themes in each month for each stakeholder group as well as the newsmaker, the actors who are relevant to the most popular posts.

Findings & Analysis

The assigned categories aim to track relevant topics of interest that are relevant to the political developments in the wake of the coup. Figure 16  illustrates the top three overperforming topics for each stakeholder group across the months of April, May and June 2023. As can be seen, in some places there are more than one topic in some of the places as a consequence of equal number of posts relating to those topics.

Figure 16: Top Content Categories from Targeted Stakeholder Analysis | April - June 2023

As with the case in the previous reporting periods, content related to violence and ongoing armed conflict continues to generate the highest level of engagement across the observed Facebook groups selected for this study.  In this quarter, armed resistance (formerly cataloged as armed struggle) is the most prevalent topic making it to the top 3 overperforming topics across 3 months of study in all stakeholder groups apart from Key political groups and CSOs for April. Out of 180 posts collected and cataloged for this reporting period, 32 are related to armed resistance. Atrocities committed by the junta accounts for 19 posts, while content about coup-related killings and deaths appear in 16 of the cataloged posts. The most atrocious event which appears most frequently this quarter is the Pazigyi air raid by junta on the 11th of April which killed at least 165 people including many civilians.

Approximately 19 of the cataloged posts related to protests in Yangon and other towns and villages. These protests, campaigns and demonstrations are mostly connected to the Pazigyi air massacre, Myanmar New Year’s week in mid-April, and celebrations of Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday on the 19th of June.

There were approximately 42 posts this period which were categorized as “other coup-related posts” since they did not fit into some of the broad categories used thus far. These posts include, for example, speeches and interviews of the resistance leaders, feature stories of individuals or an important event in the resistance movement.

In this period, posts related to the coup d’état and the resistance movement made up to 122 posts, over two third of total 180 of cataloged posts, which constitutes a slight decrease from the 124 posts cataloged in the previous reporting period. There was a notable decrease in the number of overperforming posts related to battles compared to last quarter (from 13 to 4 posts). Arrests of civilians by the junta appear in 7 posts and the civil disobedience movement (CDM) in just 1 post. No content relating to women and gender based violence was observed in this quarter’s analysis. Only 2 posts out of the total 180 are related to the Federal Constitution.  This reflects the seemingly low public interest in the progress of political dialogues at the National Unity Consultative Council and other platforms.

Among the 58 posts which are not related to the coup d’état, distribution is not even among three groups nor three months. Non-coup related posts are most prevalent in ethnic media group (32 posts) and least common in the key political groups and CSOs group (only 6 posts). There was a surge of non-coup related content in May due to news reports and practical information provided for Cyclone Mocha which affected Rakhine state and northwest regions.

Another measure for our Targeted Stakeholders Analysis is the related actors. Each content is coded according to the major actors which appears in or referred to in the posts. The related actors, or the ‘news-makers’, is yet another important dimension to monitor continuities and changes of Myanmar’s online information space. Naturally, many of the cataloged posts have more than one related actor assigned to them.

Myanmar’s junta has the most frequent appearances, mentioned in 38 posts, which is 21.1% of total posts observed this quarter. It is only a slight decrease from 42 appearances in the last quarter. Following that, the People Defense Forces (PDF)/other resistance forces and the ethnic resistance organizations appear as the second most mentioned actors (29 and 22 posts each). This is to be noted together with the fact that contents related to armed conflict and violence are most prevalent in the above analysis as well as the most important misinformation narratives being discrediting the PDFs and EROs in the Misinformation Narratives session.

Apart from these three groups, the National Unity Government and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw appears in 13 and 12 posts respectively. Protests which celebrated Myanmar’s New Year in mid April and the birthday of detained State’s Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi in June made protests groups and Aung San Suu Kyi herself significant appearances (19 and 17 times respectively). NUCC and civil society organizations (CSOs) appear in 3 posts each.

Key Takeaways

This is the third report in a pilot study that will aim to track trends and patterns in the Burmese online information landscape. The mixed-methods approach employed during this pilot study provides some preliminary insights into narratives and tactics being employed in Myanmar’s digital environment. Looking across the data collected as part of this pilot study, we have identified three key takeaways that organizations engaged in the Burmese information environment or civil society should consider as they try to engage communities around reliable information.

1. First, the themes highlighted in the Narrative Catalog shed light on the military’s tactics for weaponizing information with the goal of destabilizing and dividing Burmese society. In particular, this activity analyzes how specific instances of mis and disinformation work together to exploit pre-existing grievances or historical cleavages between groups. One of the most important findings from our Narratives Catalog is the identification of mis and disinformation that is currently being circulated with the aim of sowing division among and/or weakening the democratic opposition and public support for democratic institutions. Understanding these overarching narratives, and how they change over time, can provide independent media and civil society with a view of how to build resilience against future mis and disinformation. These resilience-building efforts must go beyond fact-checking and myth-busting to include proactive messaging and digital media literacy campaigns that seek to mitigate against the harmful effects of mis and disinformation narratives before they are produced and disseminated by malign actors.  
2. Second, codifying pro-regime content that circulates on Telegram provides more specific and immediate insights to inform counter-mis and disinformation efforts that are currently being led by civil society and independent media. This particular type of research is becoming increasingly important due to the size of the following that pro-regime channels have amassed, and the increasing efficacy with which the military and its supporters are weaponizing the platform against the pro-democracy movement. For example, in this reporting period we observed several different tactics in the analyzed pro-regime channels, including the dissemination of narratives of normalcy and the regime’s apparent victory, gender-based and sexual orientation-based attacks and targeting, and the continued weaponization race and religion to further instigate tensions between the public and the pro-democratic actors.
3. Finally, our Stakeholder Analysis aims to provide a high-level overview of which coup-related topics are currently receiving the most attention. The findings presented in this pilot study illustrate interesting differences across the three key stakeholder groups and the topics that generate engagement for each group. In this initial study, the sample size of data collected is relatively small, however tracking trends in the type of information produced by a variety of key stakeholders in the Burmese online environment over time is important. Understanding the volume of engagement with information about coup-related events and political themes in the Burmese environment can shed light on public sentiment. In this period, approximately ⅓ of cataloged posts in the Targeted Stakeholder Analysis were not strictly related to political events linked to the coup. This is indicative of a slight gradual increase when compared to previous periods, and is a trend that we will monitor and report on in the final report.

DPS will continue to employ and refine this approach to track trends in the Burmese online information environment, including instances of mis and disinformation. The findings from our ongoing analysis will be presented in upcoming reports with the goal of identifying trends over time.

Appendix

Research Information Accounts

Stakeholder Groups