Burmese Online Information Landscape Report No. 2

Reporting Period

January - March 2023

Executive Summary

As part of an ongoing project aiming to promote tolerance and social cohesion in Myanmar, Digital Public Square has conducted a pilot study on the online information landscape in the country. Through a mixed-methods approach, this second report tracks and analyzes prevalent pro-regime mis and disinformation narratives and provides a high level overview of important topics and events in the online space, during the observed reporting period (1 January 2023 - 31 March 2023). This is the second report produced as a result of this pilot.

Table of Contents

About this Report 

Narratives Catalog

Methodology

Findings & Analysis

Codified Content of Pro-Regime Telegram Channels

Methodology

Findings & Analysis

Targeted Stakeholder Analysis

Methodology

Findings & Analysis

Next Steps

About this Report

As in almost every society today, social media plays an important role in Myanmar’s political culture. Even prior to the military coup in 2021, the use of printed media in Myanmar had already been on decline, as more and more people adopted online media to consume information and news over the traditional media outlets. Unsurprisingly, this trend accelerated in the aftermath of the coup, as printed editions of independent media - which were already struggling to survive - were halted by the military coup. Other forms of physical space for public discourse and free expression, such as public meetings, panel discussions, demonstrations, and even political discussions at tea shops, were sabotaged by brutal repression campaigns by the military, including arbitrary arrests and the confiscation of property.

With the demise of that physical space, the online information landscape has become even more relevant. The information has also been decentralized not only at the consumer end but also at the producer's end. The influx of information and its nature put an even heavier burden on independent media and civil society to verify and counter malicious information online. Against these backdrops, media channels on Telegram also increased, which quickly became an epicenter of the military's misinformation campaigns. To better understand the information pollution occurring across the Burmese information landscape, DPS launched a pilot study, consisting of four quarterly reports covering from October 2022 to August 2023. The pilot study will aim to provide a longitudinal review of the shifting information landscape in the country through a series of reports. The report’s mixed-methods approach consists of three research tracks: i) cataloging  refuted mis/disinformation narratives online, ii) codifying of content in pro-military Telegram channels, and iii) targeted stakeholders analysis via CrowdTangle. The combination of these methodologies offers diverse insights into important trends and issues related to Myanmar’s online information landscape.

Who we are

Digital Public Square is a Canadian not-for-profit organization that aims to serve communities-in-need with good technology. Our work has grown to reach millions of people worldwide across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Digital Public Square has been engaged in Myanmar since November 2019, on a program that seeks to increase tolerance and inclusion for religious and ethnic minorities. We work closely with multiple local partners and experts in the country, adapting to the dramatically dynamic environment.

Narratives Catalog 

The study of the narratives of military mis- and dis-information is a crucial part of this report. Flourishing of the Facebook endeavors to crackdown dis-information and hate speech in Myanmar coincided not just with the coup d’état in February 2021 but also with the beginning of public use of Telegram following the coup. Facebook was officially banned by the military shortly after the coup.^[1] Additionally, the widely used instant messaging platform Messenger was not considered secure enough anymore for users in the light of increased surveillance of the internet by the military. Against that backdrop, attempts have been made to fill the information gap to keep people informed of the events unfolding at a very dynamic rate and to mobilize people online. Telegram and Signal began to be trailed among pro-democracy activists and opposition circles because they both provide encrypted messaging service. After a while, Telegram stands out from the duo since it accommodates the functions of both Facebook and Messenger: a social networking platform (with limited functionalities) and an instant messaging service. Both platforms became widely used in a short period of time. Other functions beyond instant messaging service were explored and utilized quickly. Channels were first used to create open source scout platforms to inform those who are concerned about the security force’s movements and sizes. Virtual neighborhoods were created only on the basis of townships and shared security related updates in the groups and channels. Subsequently, the military also started using it to compensate for its online communities being banned on Facebook as part of its anti-hate speech and misinformation efforts.

Now we are into the 3rd year of military control in Myanmar, the military’s or its affiliated channels on Telegram enjoying substantial follower counts ranging from several thousands to forty thousands. The purpose of this study is to explore the narratives underlying the military’s mis- and dis-information campaigns mostly on Telegram, but to a much lesser extent on Facebook. Rather than tracking, mapping channels, groups and accounts, this stream of research deals with exploring generalizable trends and outliers in the contents of the mis- and dis-information that we captured and cataloged. The inquiry, consequently, does not include the extent to which the mis- and dis-information efforts from different sources are being coordinated.

Methodology

This research track aims to collect quantitative data on the nature and frequency of false narratives being circulated online. To do so, we compiled a list of 10 online accounts (see Appendix) that consistently identify and counter false information in the Burmese online environment. We then review, catalog and categorize the instances of false information that have been debunked via these selected research accounts. This approach relies on the reliable research conducted by fact-checker sites and organizations already operating in this space, and aims to provide a quantitative lens to these efforts. In this period, we cataloged 90 instances of false information published in the January-March 2023 period.

Findings & Analysis

Targets of Disinformation

Targets of the disinformation campaigns by the military is one of the key indices we employed in Narrative Catalog. Each instance of military disinformation is firstly coded according to the target or the perceived victim of the disinformation. The targets here do not connote the audience of the campaigns but the institutions or individuals the disinformation campaigns are perceived to discredit or undermine.

The data in the second period largely corresponds with findings in the first report period. The NUG/PDF/CRPH/NUCC collective followed by the ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) are still the largest targets of the military's disinformation campaigns. Out of 90 instances cataloged over the first quarter of 2023, 63 are targeted towards the collective of NUG/PDF/CRPH/NUCC, either alone or together with another group, which is most of the time ethnic armed groups.

The ethnic armed groups themselves were attacked by 28 instances of disinformation this quarter, making up nearly one-third of the total number of instances which are cataloged. It should be noted that the term “ethnic resistance organization”, is not a single actor but an umbrella term encompassing multiple groups which are entirely independent from each other, though sometimes coordinated.

The other targets including the National League for Democracy, the Civil Disobedience Movement, Rohingya people and independent media were targeted to a much lesser extent, only to be targeted one time each apart from the NLD which was attacked in two instances. This suggested that the NUG/PDF/CRPH/NUCC and its EROs allies which made up the political leadership of the resistance movement remain the major targets of military disinformation campaigns while still discrediting other targets yet at a minimum rate.

Actors and Actions 

Coding instances of disinformation  according to the actors in their actions in these instances is another important element of our methodology. Through coding and analysis actors, we aim to grasp the narratives which the disinformation campaigns are designed to push forward. Figure 3 illustrates the breakdown of the frequencies of certain disinformation narratives observed in this round of study. These narratives are generally divided into two groups based on their frequencies. Those with repeated supporting instances are grouped as significant trends and those with low frequencies as outliers. It should be noted that although the narratives with high frequencies reflect the military’s major narratives, outliers should not be altogether ignored but should be observed and monitored closely. While looking at the analysis below, it would be helpful to keep in mind that the numbers of instances supporting different narratives are not exclusive to each other but indeed they sometimes overlap since a single narrative can be designed to support more than one narrative.

 Figure 3: Frequency of narratives cataloged from research accounts | January - March 2023

Significant Trends

Most significant trend among the disinformation narratives is the one which portrays that People Defense Forces (PDF) are perpetrating against the Burmese population. This trend conforms with the data from the last quarter. In fact, the number of instances supporting that narrative even increased significantly from 20 in the last quarter to 33 instances in the current reporting period. This means that more than one-third of the disinformation instances we studied this quarter are dedicated to promoting this single narrative.

This trend is followed by another frequent narrative which suggests that the Ethnic Resistance Organizations are perpetrating against the population.^[2] We found 16 instances that conform to this narrative, which account to only half of the trend above trend and 17.8 percent of the total number of instances. Yet, it is a slight increase from the last quarter where there were 14 of such instances. After these two largest trends comes the narrative which connects these two major targets: the People Defense Forces and Ethnic Resistance Organizations as partners in crime. While collaborations between the NUG/PDF and certain Ethnic Resistance Organizations at different levels is widely known to the public, the disinformation campaigns seek to portray them as accomplices to each other’s crime. Out of 9 instances which show connection between these two entities, 7 claimed that the PDFs and the EROs are perpetrating against the Myanmar population together and  that they are perpetrating against Buddhism. This is also a continuing trend from the last quarter.

Another remarkable trend is that the PDFs and EROs are in trouble and the junta is winning against those. 7 instances claimed that the PDFs are in trouble generally and 2 said EROs are in trouble. The narratives which goes that the junta is winning against EROs; NUG; and PDFs are repeated 4, 3 and 2 times respectively.

Outliers

Aside from these significant trends, there are also a number of outlying narratives. These instances are not necessarily in conflict with the significant trends but these narratives appear less often (once per narrative) among the instances cataloged for this reporting period. Despite their limited numbers occurring, they cannot be ignored but should rather be closely monitored.  

These narratives include: PDFs and EROs are perpetrating Buddhism; Rohingya are asking for a state of their own from the Arakan Army; the NUG instructed the PDFs to assassinate a number of politicians and party leaders; the NUG is arming Bangladeshi men and providing them military training; and that former military officers who had joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) are in fact sleeper agents and had been feeding the junta with information on PDF’s plans. These narratives’ fewer occurrences indicates that the military’s lesser focus on promoting these narratives compared to those in the above significant trend and the transient nature of individual instances which makes these difficult to be repeated over time. This also indicates that the junta perceives less potential of certain narratives over time. Portraying the resistance movement as a threat to Buddhism; and associating the resistance movement and the ethnic resistance organizations with Rohingya people; for example, might have been deemed less powerful to undermine the political opposition by the junta unlike in the disinformation campaigns prior to the coup.

Codified Content of Pro-Regime Telegram Channels

Methodology

In parallel to the methodology described above, we also employed a pilot approach which would aim to sample, categorize and analyze content from public pro-military Telegram channels. This research offers qualitative coding of extracted data from selected Telegram channels, and aims to provide a qualitative textual analysis on the type of hate speech, misinformation and propaganda narratives being circulated on the pro-military channels. For this small pilot study, the research focused on six pro-military Telegram channels all of which were public and had over 10,000 followers. Some channels originally observed in the first report were no longer available and as a result, we had to select three new channels for this report.

Given that the size of the Telegram channels and the frequency of posting varied from channel to channel, the study codified a random sample of 500 posts per channel, which was well above the minimum sample size calculated. The study analyzed 500 random posts from each Telegram channel except one channel with only 414 posts, published sometime between 1 January 2023 and 31 March 2023. This random sampling was then categorized and analyzed to provide the insights below.

Findings & Analysis

According to our analysis, the mis-information campaign continued in the second reporting periods with at least 3.3 percent of the 2,914 samples analyzed containing misinformation. While the figure is seemingly lower than the first reporting period, it should be noted that we have only limited access to verify the information posted on these channels. The nature of the misinformation remains consistent with our initial findings described in the first report. For the second reporting period (January 2023 - March 2023), we have focused on the analysis of the key objectives of their campaigns as these channels show an uptick in hate speech, dehumanizing slurs, unfounded accusations, doxing and defamation (Figure 4). The prevalence of such mal-information outpaces that of misinformation and disinformation in the second reporting period.

Through an in-depth qualitative text analysis of the contents posted in these channels, we can distinguish three primary objectives underlying their campaigns on Telegram:

i) Contesting political legitimacy with domestic and international narratives

ii) Sowing fear, distrust and confusion among the pro-democracy fractions

iii) Dehumanizing the pro-democracy and revolutionary forces.

We have also noted a recurring strategy of these Telegram channels wherein religion (specifically Buddhism) and racial/ethnic themes are employed to fortify their narratives and undermine the pro-democracy forces.

i) Contesting political legitimacy with domestic and international narratives

Under this objective, the pro-military telegram channels appear to both reinforce the regime's own political legitimacy while simultaneously attempting to undermine that of their opponents. Our sentiment analysis  demonstrates that over 50% of the negative attacks target the NUG and PDF collectively, which are claiming to be the parallel legitimate government and the legitimate armed forces of the nation (refer to Figure 5). This suggests that the pro-military accounts perceive the NUG/PDF as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the military regime. In contrast, the entities conventionally viewed by the military as adversaries — the NLD and EAO/EROs — are referenced in a mere 3% and 10% of the posts, respectively. When these entities are mentioned, they are typically accused of playing ancillary roles, providing financial support or offering armed training and weapons to the NUG/PDFs.

By casting the NUG/PDF as "terrorists", the pro-military accounts frame them within the global anti-terrorism narrative, trying to undermine their international credibility and making it harder for the diplomatic community to openly work with them. To this effect domestically, they employ the ‘religion’ to cast the NUG/PDF as enemies of both Buddhism and the Buddhist nation, whereas they portray the military as the protector of the ‘race, religion and sāsana/Buddhist teaching’ (အမျိုး၊ ဘာသာ၊ သာသနာ). The pro-military accounts have also been found to attribute the deterioration of the health and education sectors of the country to NUG/PDFs. Figure 6 shows a sample of these domestic narratives and Figure 7 shows a telegram channel account accusing NUG of being responsible for the school-aged children not attending school and becoming workers, using random photos from the internet. Overall, these tactics shine a light on the ongoing battle for political legitimacy internationally and domestically, and hint at the underlying insecurities within the military establishment and its forced rule on the unwilling population.

ii) Sowing fear, distrust and confusion amid the pro-democracy and revolutionary fractions

The second objective of the pro-military accounts is to intimidate and sow confusion among the supporters of the revolution. This is also the continuation of a disturbing trend which we have already noted in our first report in which the individuals purportedly supporting the NUG/PDF/NLD are 'doxed', with their personal details, such as addresses and photographs, being publicly shared (as shown in Figure 8). Another example of this kind of ‘doxing’ could be found in Figure 9 in which the pro-military accounts are calling for the arrest of local vendors who allegedly supplied Pencilo’s shop (an outspoken social influencer who had fled to the United States and continued her support of the revolution by fundraising online and publicly speaking). Following these disclosures, the identified individuals named in these posts are often detained by SAC law enforcement under ‘anti-terrorism’ charges and subsequently publicly humiliated on these telegram channels.

We have observed another concerning trend that is aligned with this objective, which involves the dissemination of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information, all aimed at engendering distrust and confusion among the pro-democracy and revolutionary factions. For instance, these channels frequently advance the narrative that the prisoned State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is distancing herself from the NUG/PDF, in an apparent bid to diminish the perceived legitimacy of the armed revolution. In Figure 10, it is alleged that the PDFs were incensed with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for labeling them as 'terrorists', a claim that can be readily discredited. Additionally, these pro-military accounts are often swift to portray any disagreements among the revolutionary groups as signs of their impending disintegration and collapse of the revolution. These strategies seem tailored to deter the public support for the revolution and suppress dissent on social media platforms, thereby nurturing a climate of fear and confusion.

iii) Dehumanizing the pro-democracy and revolutionary forces

The third objective underpinning their online campaigns is to label the opponents of the regime with name-calling, slurs and accusations to deny them of dignity and humanity. This is alarming and disturbing as the international experience has shown that dehumanization of the opponents often precedes war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides. The frequently deployed dehumanizing slurs include အနူဂျီ (a person suffering from leprosy disease) for NUG, ပဒက် (a kind of lizard, which is often associated with poverty in Burmese cultural logic) for PDFs, နီပိန်း (foolish red supporters) for pro-democracy supporters, and ခွေး ​(dog) among others in addition to often labeling them ‘terrorists’, ‘thieves’ and ‘beggars’.

Our analysis has noted that the pro-military Telegram channels have mostly directed their negative attacks against the entities such as NUG, CRPH, PDF, EROs/EAOs, and individuals involved in the CDM (Figure 11). The distribution of the most negative content across the studied six telegram channels, frequently employing derogatory language, discriminatory remarks, sexually abusive words and slurs for revolutionary forces could be seen in Figure 12.

Targeted Stakeholder Analysis

Targeted Stakeholder Analysis is a monthly review of content posted by key stakeholders in the Burmese online environment. The purpose of this monthly monitoring activity is to get a high level view of the social media landscape in Myanmar, with a particular focus on discourse related to the coup and resistance movements.

Methodology

The Facebook pages of relevant stakeholders have been categorized into 3 groups: Myanmar Media (30 pages), Ethnic Media (33 pages), and Key Political Groups and CSOs (28 pages). The full list of pages can be found in the Appendix.

These lists were carefully curated in CrowdTangle to capture diverse opinions and priorities from different stakeholders in Burma, and to ultimately explore the most popular posts from the different stakeholder groups. For the second reporting period, from January to March 2023, we cataloged a total of 180 posts, 20 posts from each stakeholder group per month. This analysis provides quantitative insights into online discourse on Facebook in Myanmar, and through monthly tracking and analysis  we aim to reveal changes and trends in Myanmar’s digital information landscape. Among a number of criteria of the popularity of posts on Crowdtangle, we chose to use ‘Overperforming’ as our criteria to rank the posts. Unlike ‘Total Interaction’ which ranks posts according to their absolute number of interactions, thereby disproportionately representing the most popular pages, ‘Overperforming’ ensures the inclusion of less popular pages by numerous stakeholders.^[3] In this study, 180 overperforming posts were cataloged and reviewed. After gathering posts from Crowdtangle, each post is coded according to their ‘categories’ and ‘relevant actors’. Category(ies) of a post refers to general themes that the post is related to and the relevant actors are the prominent institution or individuals which are directly or indirectly referred to in the post. Coding the collected posts in these ways allows us to see the most popular themes in each month for each stakeholder group as well as the newsmaker, the actors who are relevant to the most popular posts.

Findings & Analysis

The categories are defined to ensure the coverage of all relevant yet generalizable themes which are discussed along with the political development since the wake of the coup. Figure 13 below illustrates the top three overperforming topics for each stakeholder group across the months of January, February and March 2023.

Figure 13: Top Content Categories from Targeted Stakeholder Analysis | January - March 2023

Following the trend from the last reporting period, contents relating to conflict and violence influence Myanmar online space. Themes such as armed resistance, battle, killings and deaths are most popular across stakeholder groups over both reporting periods. Out of 180 posts collected, 124 were related to the coup d’état, which is 68.9 percent. It is a decrease from 75.9 percent from the previous reporting period, which also means an increase in non coup-related posts. We shall continue to monitor this trend in future reporting periods of the pilot study.  

As in the case of the previous reporting period, posts relating to the ongoing armed resistance makes the largest number of posts among different categories (47 posts), followed by those relating to killings/deaths (21 posts) and junta’s atrocities (17 posts). The Civil Disobedience Movement is referred to in 6 posts among 180 posts cataloged, a slight increase from 5 posts in the last reporting period.

Furthermore, in Figure 13 we observe that posts relating to armed resistance received high levels of engagement in this reporting period, across all 3 stakeholder groups, as the topic appeared 8 times in our overperformance chart. The second highest overperforming topic related to killings and deaths, appearing 6 times.

However, posts relating to gender based violence were not found among these 180 overperforming posts in this quarter. In the same vein, there was also no Rohingya related content among them. Despite having several important dates, including the New Year’s first days, the second anniversary of the coup and the Union day, this quarter saw a decrease in the number of posts relating to non-violent protests (14 posts) from the last quarter (22 posts). Also, there were only 2 posts related to the federal constitution or the Federal Democracy Charter in the cataloged posts. This could potentially suggest that the public discourse relating to the coup d’état and the resistance focuses disproportionately more on its practical aspects than the ideological elements.  

Out of 180 posts, 32 are related to the coup and the resistance yet they do not fit neatly into the other categories. They are all grouped into a miscellaneous category called ‘other’. Actual content of the posts contains various subjects such as a memorial statement by the Karen National Union on the anniversary of a leader’s assassination; screening of fundraising resistance film in Malaysia with diaspora communities; and the members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) attending the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)’s meeting.

Figure 14: Frequency of key actors mentioned during Targeted Stakeholder Analysis, January - March 2023

Another index that we used to monitor information on Myanmar’s online space is the ‘related actors’. As described above, each post is tagged with individuals and institutions that are referred to in the post (Figure 14). Following the trend from the last quarter, the junta is still the largest news maker (42 times), closely followed by the People Defense Forces (PDFs) and different armed resistance groups (39 times). Ethnic resistance organizations made it to the third place with appearance in 24 posts. Protest groups and prominent individuals only 17 and 16 times respectively. This difference between different actors corresponds with the predominance of armed resistance and junta atrocities compared to non-violent protests and reflects the conditions in Myanmar where non-violent protests are barely permissible.

Another interesting finding is the limited appearance of supposedly important actors in the United States, China and the National League for Democracy (NLD). The United States only appears 3 times and China and the NLD party appear one time each. Unlike in the last quarter, we separated the NUG/CRPH/NUCC collective into three different actors. Tagging collectively last quarter, these actors appear in 13 posts in total. In this quarters the actors, the NUG, the CRPH and the NUCC, were separately coded and appeared 15, 7 and 5 times respectively.

Key Takeaways

This is the second report in a pilot study that will aim to track trends and patterns in the Burmese online information landscape. The mixed-methods approach employed during this pilot study provides some preliminary insights into narratives and tactics being employed in Myanmar’s digital environment. Looking across the data collected as part of this pilot study, we have identified three key takeaways that organizations engaged in the Burmese information environment or civil society should consider as they try to engage communities around reliable information.

1. First, the themes highlighted in the Narrative Catalog shed light on the military’s tactics for weaponizing information with the goal of destabilizing and dividing Burmese society. In particular, this activity analyzes how specific instances of mis and disinformation work together to exploit pre-existing grievances or historical cleavages between groups. In particular, this reporting period saw a significant increase from last reporting period in mis/disinformation narratives that targeted the NUG, PDF, CRPH or NUCC. Furthermore in this quarter, a popular narrative that we continued to observe in this period is that the Burmese population is being persecuted by EROs, PDFs and the NUG. As highlighted in the first report, one of the most important findings from our Narratives Catalog is the identification of mis and disinformation that is currently being circulated with the aim of sowing division among and/or weakening the democratic opposition and public support for democratic institutions. Understanding these overarching narratives, and how they change over time, can provide independent media and civil society with a view of how to build resilience against future mis and disinformation. These resilience-building efforts must go beyond fact-checking and myth-busting to include proactive messaging and digital media literacy campaigns that seek to mitigate against the harmful effects of mis and disinformation narratives before they are produced and disseminated by malign actors.  
2. Second, codifying pro-regime content that circulates on Telegram provides more specific and immediate insights to inform counter-mis and disinformation efforts that are currently being led by civil society and independent media. This particular type of research is becoming increasingly important due to the size of the following that pro-regime channels have amassed, and the increasing efficacy with which the military and its supporters are weaponizing the platform against the pro-democracy movement.
3. Finally, our Stakeholder Analysis aims to provide a high-level overview of which coup-related topics are currently receiving the most attention. The findings presented in this pilot study illustrate interesting differences across the three key stakeholder groups and the topics that generate engagement for each group. In this initial study, the sample size of data collected is relatively small, however tracking trends in the type of information produced by a variety of key stakeholders in the Burmese online environment over time is important. Understanding the volume of engagement with information about coup-related events and political themes in the Burmese environment can shed light on public sentiment. For example, it will be interesting to track the proportion of posts cataloged in each stakeholder's top 20 overperforming list that do not pertain to coup-related news (and therefore classified as “other”). While some actors naturally post less frequently on coup-related topics than others, this trend may shed light on how the supply of information in the country changes over time, either in response to changes in consumer demand or as a result of constraints on freedom of speech.

DPS will continue to employ and refine this approach to track trends in the Burmese online information environment, including instances of mis and disinformation. The findings from our ongoing analysis will be presented in upcoming reports with the goal of identifying trends over time.

Appendix

Research Information Accounts

Stakeholder Groups