Tracking Public Opinion on Tolerance, Governance, and Media
in Myanmar

Executive Summary

Digital Public Square (DPS), a Canadian not-for-profit, conducted four nationwide online surveys in Myanmar between March 2020 and February 2023 to gather and track public opinion on various topics related to tolerance, democracy, and media consumption. The longitudinal analysis of these findings provides insights into how beliefs and perceptions around these topics have changed over the last 4 years in Myanmar, particularly in the aftermath of the coup. The purpose of the findings report is to highlight key insights and trends from the data collected that can help diverse stakeholders promote social cohesion and support the pro-democratic movement in Myanmar.

Key Takeaways

About Digital Public Square

Digital Public Square is a Canadian not-for-profit organization that aims to serve

communities-in-need with good technology. Our work has grown to reach millions of

people worldwide across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Digital

Public Square has been engaged in Myanmar since November 2019, on a program that

seeks to increase tolerance and inclusion for religious and ethnic minorities. We work

closely with multiple local partners and experts in the country, adapting to the dramatically dynamic environment.

Introduction

In 2020, DPS began a project aimed at increasing tolerance and inclusion for ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar. The need for interventions focusing on these issues have become increasingly critical since the rapid development of Myanmar’s online media space that has introduced and reinforced dangerous social norms on a national scale. Instead of providing space for the expression of a diversity of opinions, the internet and social media has created an increasingly constrained environment for religious freedom, which fuels inter-religious and ethnic distrust, hostility, and violence.

The first stage of this project focused on conducting research about opinions, perspectives and gaps in knowledge or norms that present key barriers towards tolerant coexistence in Myanmar. Thus, four nationwide surveys were conducted between March 2020 and February 2023 in order to gather public opinion on various topics related to democracy, rights and information. This report is a longitudinal analysis of these findings and helps us understand how beliefs and perceptions about tolerance, media consumption and institution building have changed over the last 3 years in Myanmar, especially in the context of the coup.

Figure 1. Timeline of four nationwide surveys (indicated as waves) that were conducted from 2020 - 2023 and in context of the coup.

Survey Samples

Survey	Complete Responses	Women	Mean age	Buddhists	City dwellers	High school educated or higher
1	2085	24%	30	73%	45%	78%
2	2075	24%	28	74%	43%	83%
3	2081	28%	31	78%	40%	78%
4	1921	45%	24	83%	48%	81%

Figure 2. Table with the demographic breakdown of people who responded to each survey.

Considerations

Firstly, the surveys were distributed and completed by respondents online. The first 3 survey waves were distributed through random domain intercept technology. In these first 3 waves, the demographics are relatively similar, being skewed male, highly educated and young. The fourth wave survey was administered via an online panel, which targeted respondents on the basis of age, gender and region in order to collect a sample that was somewhat closer to the most recently available census data. In our analysis further below, all effects are controlled for age, gender, educational level and religion.

Another important consideration to note is that all 4 surveys were distributed online, meaning that we must be cautious in assuming on how some of the observed behaviours or trends apply to the rest of the population, and indeed the subsets of the population that are offline. Initially, DPS had planned to administer in-person surveys within Myanmar, but the COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup made all in-country events infeasible for this project. Therefore, given the respondent recruitment strategy used in these surveys, the findings are likely to be representative of the internet-using population, and are not intended to be interpreted as nationally-representative. It is also important to note that the use of VPNs in Burma increased significantly in the aftermath of the coup, as a result of the military regime’s internet shutdowns, censorships, and platform blocks. This could have also impacted certain people's ability to participate effectively in our online surveys.

Finally, these surveys were only available in Burmese, and not in any other ethnic languages. Thus, the survey sampled does not capture the segment of the population that does not read Burmese.

Survey Findings

Tolerance and Social Cohesion

Myanmar is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country with a diverse population. However, tensions between the majority Bamar ethnic group and various ethnic minority groups have been a significant source of conflict. Transitions between periods of political instability, military rule, and civilian-led governments have led to deep divisions and mistrust among different communities. Thus, we were interested in learning about how the population’s perception of and attitude towards ethnic and religious minorities have evolved over the last 3 years.

Throughout the four survey waves, we observed gradual but non-linear improvements in tolerance towards minority groups. While there is need for more inclusivity in the pro-democracy movement, there are many groups, “most visibly under the banner of the General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSC-N), that have been impactful and innovative contributors to the pro-democracy movement” (Ostwald and Hlaing, 2021). Ethnic armed organisations such as the Chin National Front and the Lahu Democratic Union, have also openly joined the NUG and other major actors like the Kachin Independence Army and the Karen National Union have engaged with the pro-democracy movement and provided training to protestors. These small steps towards tolerance and democracy over the past few years show us that there is an important opportunity happening in Myanmar to foster social cohesion across ethnic and religious lines, and it is critical - particularly in the ongoing aftermath of the military takeover - to sustain this momentum.

Tolerance towards Ethnic minorities

Broadly in the Myanmar context, we consider ethnic minorities to be any group other than Bamar. In survey 1 and 2, we defined ethnic minorities as those “native to the land” (တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ) which can exclude certain groups. The new definition we used in survey 3 (လူနည်းစုလူမျိုးများ) is more inclusive of a diverse set of minority groups, such as the Rohingya, unlike the popular notion of the former word . In the final survey, we wanted to assess whether the old and new formulations of “ethnic minorities'' impacted the perceived threat and contribution respectively. Overall, we found that people perceived lower contribution and higher threat from the more inclusive definition of ethnic minority, in comparison to the more traditional definition. It is also important to note that we recognize that “ethnic minorities” is an umbrella term to designate a group that is not monolithic, and that indeed it encompasses various groups that will have varying degrees of acceptance within Burmese society.

To assess tolerance towards ethnic minorities, we asked people how much they agree or disagree with the following statements:

They could select one answer from the following 5 options: strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), somewhat disagree (4) and strongly disagree (5). Analysis of responses to these questions found that:

Figure 3. Graph showing how respondents felt about the contribution of minorities to society (blue) and the threat from minorities (pink).

Tolerance towards Muslims

In addition to tracking tolerance towards ethnic groups, we also tracked tolerance of religious minorities in Myanmar, with a particular focus on Muslims. The Muslim community in Myanmar has particularly experienced heightened levels of ethnic and religious discrimination, largely due to politicized or fabricated issues concerning intermarriage and accusations of illegal immigration. This discrimination has also been institutional as a result of the Burma Citizenship Law in 1982, which many have claimed to have directly resulted in the stateless status of the Rohingya. While the terms of the Citizenship Law technically did not render Rohingya Muslims stateless, the deliberate breach and selective application of these Citizenship Law terms effectively did. (Cheesman, 2017) From 2012 onwards Buddhist/Muslim relations deteriorated sharply and gave way to the Rohingya refugee crisis.

Therefore, to assess the current state of tolerance towards Muslims, we asked people how much they agree or disagree with the following statements:

Figure 4. Graph showing how respondents felt about the contribution of Muslims to society (blue) and the threat from Muslims (pink).

Support for Minority rights

To assess the support for minority rights in Myanmar, in survey waves 2, 3 and 4, we asked people how much they agree or disagree with the following statements:

We combined people's responses to these 3 statements to calculate one composite score that reflects each respondent’s level of support for minority rights.

Figure 5. Graph showing the composite score of support for minority rights, which combines people's responses to the 3 statements listed directly above.

As evidenced in Figure 5, support for minority rights is generally quite high, and has not changed significantly between March 2021 and February 2023. This finding is particularly interesting when we consider the fluctuations in tolerance towards both ethnic minorities and Muslims, as mentioned above. When conducting further analysis of the findings, we found that those who perceive lower degrees of threat from minorities also tend to be more supportive of minority rights. Most recently, in 2023 we found that:

While high levels of support are encouraging, it is interesting to note that approximately 21% to 27% of respondents only value minority rights to a certain extent [3]. Upon further analysis, we found that these respondents were more likely to have lower education levels, to live in a village, and to be non-Buddhist. To further advance social cohesion in Myanmar, it will be important to further understand this particular segment of the population and to find ways of conveying to them that the protection of everyone’s rights is ultimately more beneficial to society.

Figure 6. Graph showing the extent to which respondents value the rights for: protection for all minorities (left), receive equal treatment and not be discriminated against (middle) and participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and political life (right).

In addition to assessing individual support for minority rights, we also assessed perceptions around the social norms related to tolerance towards minorities in Myanmar in survey waves 2, 3 & 4.

To what extent do you believe that other people in Myanmar value tolerance towards minority groups in Myanmar?

Figure 7. Graph showing how respondents perceive tolerance towards minorities by others in Myanmar.

It is interesting, but perhaps not surprising, to note that across all 3 waves in which we measured both individual support for minority rights and perceived social norms around tolerance towards minorities, the individual support levels were consistently higher than the perceived social norms. That being said, the perceived social norms around tolerance towards minority groups (Figure 7) are still relatively high, which is encouraging. In our work, we have found that people tend to align their beliefs and attitudes to comply with the perceived social norms - therefore, these findings around social norms in particular could be valuable in campaigns and initiatives that aim to promote social cohesion and tolerance in Myanmar and in the diaspora.

Sentiment towards Democratic Institutions

Myanmar has gone through significant political changes over the years, transitioning from military rule to a partially democratic system until the coup in 2021. Thus, democratic progress has been challenged by ongoing political conflicts, military interventions, and human rights issues. Given that the future of democratic institutions in Myanmar remains uncertain, we wanted to understand how citizens are feeling about it so that their priorities and experiences can inform the approaches taken to promote democracy.

Governance Preferences

Note: In survey 1, respondents were presented with all three statements above and asked to rate on a 5pt scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement. For the purposes of our analysis and the illustration of data in the Figure below, we included the proportion of respondents who had indicated high levels of agreement for each claim.

Figure 8. Graph showing how respondents felt about democracy in 2020 (yellow), 2021 (blue), 2022 (purple) and 2023 (green).

We observed an increase in preferences for democracy immediately following the coup in March 2021 (77%). In wave 3, we saw evidence of a slight but significant decrease in the preference for democracy (67%). However, in wave 4 the preference for democracy improved (72%) but not to the same levels observed in wave 2. This signifies the need for continued efforts to sustain a positive change.

There are likely various factors that could explain this observed variation over the years. It is possible that the slight dip in preference for democracy in 2022 could be attributed to fatigue felt by the population regarding the protracted political crisis, one year after the coup. Likewise, it is also possible that this slight decrease could also be attributed to the evolution of the revolutionary situation, in which people were becoming more radicalised and more active in the resistance (i.e. joining PDFs), which would mean that people who are supportive of the democratic process were likely to be in remote areas with limited connectivity and/or less available to participate in our online study at that time. It is nonetheless encouraging to note the heightened preference for democracy expressed in our most recent survey in 2023.

Additionally, while the figure above shows that the majority of the surveyed population prefers democracy, identifying and understanding groups that are indifferent to, or skeptical of, democracy is an important step towards designing policies that invite these constituencies into the conversation.

Perceptions around announced 2023 elections

At the time of designing and fielding the 4th wave survey, the military had announced its intention to launch national elections in the summer of 2023 and therefore, democratic processes were a topic of national discussion. Despite these elections being postponed, we collected interesting data about the extent to which Burmese citizens believed that the planned elections would be free and fair.

The military announced its intention to launch an election in 2023. To which extent do you believe it will be a free and fair election?

Figure 9. Graph showing to what extent respondents believe the election planned for 2023 will be fair and free.

The majority (59%) of respondents did not think the election planned for 2023 would be free and fair. However, over a quarter (27%) of respondents believed the elections will be free and fair to a certain extent. Combining this with those who believed the elections will be free and fair to a large extent (5%) and very large extent (9%) means that over a third of the respondents still hold positive hope and expectations regarding the democratic process. Those who believe in a fair election tend to perceive a lower threat from minority groups but a higher threat from Muslims. They also perceive less threat from the coup and report lower levels of fury towards the military.

Based on perceptions of promised elections, we were able to breakdown what preference people had when it came to governance:

We can see from these results that those with the least faith in a free and fair election also have a clear preference for democratic governance. Additionally, most people who have some faith in a free and fair election feel that it does not matter whether there is a democratic or non-democratic regime. This indicates that if apathy or tiredness grows, people may be more likely to accept non-democratic outcomes. The belief that “under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one” has the highest or second highest % across all perceptions. These various factors highlight that further education and awareness about democratic principles is critical.

Attitudes towards the coup

People’s feelings regarding the coup can further indicate where there are opportunities to leverage support for democracy, specifically amongst citizens who felt negatively affected by the coup. When assessing anger caused by the takeover in the wave 4 survey, 64% of respondents reported feeling personally furious at the military for taking control, whereas 76% believed that citizens in general are furious. When assessing fear, 73% of respondents reported feeling fear personally and 73% believed that citizens in general felt fear.

Therefore, a significant segment of the population holds negative sentiments regarding the coup which can create space for more openness to or consideration of democratic principles, especially if they are shared and exemplified in a manner that engages people positively. One effective form of this is education about democracy that is not threatening or confrontational. Rather, the focus should be on sharing knowledge that will help people become curious and interested in learning more about alternative forms of governance and society.

Perceived social norms

In wave 3, we observed a statistically significant increase in the way people perceive opposition to the military takeover and support for the democratic process. However, these levels drop back down in wave 4. This suggests that further efforts are required to make citizens feel like their broader society still wants to work towards democracy since people tend to align their behaviour to what they perceive to be the social norms.

Figure 12. Graph showing how respondents felt about other people’s perspective on the military takeover (right) and the democratic process (left) in 2021 (blue), 2022 (green) and 2023 (orange).

Understanding well-being

Figure 13. Graph showing how much respondents felt: they were able to enjoy things (left), calm and relaxed (middle) and downhearted and blue (right).

In wave 4, we included predictors of well-being to better understand the mental health of the population. Over 51% of respondents reported being able to enjoy things, only 35% reported feeling calm and relaxed and over 58% reported feeling downhearted and blue. Furthermore, 81% of respondents reported feeling mentally exhausted as the result of the current political situation. Thus, expanding the focus and conversation on mental health and well-being is important and by showing citizens how they are linked to environmental factors, it can encourage them to seek change that improves the quality of their lives. While these data points were only collected in wave 4, the importance placed on mental health in the section below suggests that this is an important issue, and would therefore likely benefit from additional resources. Increased attention on mental health could include - but is not limited to - campaigns to reduce stigma, campaigns to increase awareness of mental health, and increased access to psychosocial services.

Future state building in Myanmar

In the aftermath of the military takeover in 2021, several domestic topics have come up in public discourse, that perhaps were not publicly or openly discussed in the past. We asked people to rank the topics listed in Figure 14 below according to how important they think each one is for public discussion in the current environment and will have the greatest impact on Myanmar's future.

We found that the peace process was a main priority for citizens so it is crucial to capitalise on the collective desire for this and focus on understanding what is needed for a peace process that will work. People who value the peace process are also more exhausted because of the coup, perceive a higher threat from the coup and find minority rights to be important.

It is worthwhile to note that even though minority rights, LGBT rights and gender issues are lower priorities for citizens, inclusivity is critical for successful peace and democracy. Despite their commitment to the resistance, minorities “continue to face discrimination and are excluded from most resistance organisations” (Ford & Ko Ko, 2022). Thus, introducing and upholding principles of non-discrimination in continued efforts for promoting democracy will help build trust among a fractious resistance and pave the path for sustainable peace.

Since it has been almost 2 years since the military takeover, in the 4th survey we asked people which of the below they feel are personally threatened by the military takeover. The key concern remains the rights and freedoms of the entire population, highlighting the importance of fostering conversation and action regarding peace building and democracy.

It has been almost 2 years since the military takeover. At this point in time, which of the below do you feel are personally threatened by the military takeover?

Figure 15. Graph showing what respondents feel is threatened by the military takeover.

Media Consumption & Misinformation

Similar to most societies today, social media plays an important role in Myanmar’s political culture. Even prior to the military coup in 2021, the use of printed media in Myanmar had already been on decline, as more and more people adopted online media to consume information and news over traditional media outlets. Unsurprisingly, this trend accelerated in the aftermath of the coup, as printed editions of independent media - which were already struggling to survive - were halted by the military coup (Reporters Without Borders, 2021). Other forms of physical space for public discourse and free expression, such as public meetings, panel discussions, demonstrations, and even political discussions at tea shops, were sabotaged by brutal repression campaigns by the military, including arbitrary arrests and the confiscation of property.

With independent media under threat and in-person gatherings becoming increasingly dangerous, online spaces have become, for many, the primary place to transact information (Freedom House, 2019). The exponential uptake of social media in parallel to these trends has led to increasingly decentralized information production, with citizen journalism playing an important role in documenting what’s happening in the country. However, in this new media environment, it can be challenging to tell fact from fiction, placing an even heavier burden on independent media and civil society to verify facts and counter malicious information online. Following the coup, Telegram became “the most popular social media app” (Standard Insights, 2022). As public engagement in these spaces grew, they quickly became an epicenter of the military's misinformation campaigns, which aim to divide and weaken the opposition through any means necessary. A trend observed so far has been the dissemination of narratives that aim to divide the population among religious and ethnic lines, which have been a source of tension in the country for decades.

In the 4th wave survey, we therefore aimed to dig deeper on this topic in order to understand where people are getting their information, and which actors they consider to be responsible for disseminating false news online. These insights allow us to understand the best ways to engage people on important issues in order to build resilience over time.

Media Consumption

In Survey 4, we asked about people’s experience with consuming information online and asked them to select all sources they consulted the most.

Over the last few weeks, which sources did you consult the most for information?

Social media, specifically Facebook, remains the main source of information for people, with approximately 47% of respondents selecting this platform. While still nowhere close to the popularity of Facebook, we still nonetheless observed that a significant proportion (approximately 15%) of respondents consult Telegram for information and news. Furthermore, Facebook and Telegram were most popular among respondents between the ages of 35-39; 57% of respondents from this age group selected Facebook, and 25% selected Telegram, both of which constitute 10% points higher than the platforms’ respective averages. This means that digital media literacy must be a priority in order to safeguard against misinformation online. It also indicates that these platforms are some of the best ways to engage people on important topics and learning.

Figure 17 below presents a breakdown of media consumption based on age and region. When looking at sources other than social media, it shows that international media outlets are the most frequently referenced sources of information for people across all demographics. Independent Burmese media sources are most popular among respondents who are 30+ years old, whereas these sources appear to be slightly less popular among respondents between the ages of 18-29.

Figure 17. Graphs showing the % of respondents that use independent Burmese media, international media outlets, NUG official source and SAC-run or affiliated media as information sources, based on age (left) and region (right).

Misinformation Online

To what extent do you agree or disagree: I am usually able to recognize fake news online.

Figure 18. Graph showing the extent to which respondents think they can recognise fake news online.

In the 4th wave survey, we included questions to better understand how people rate their own digital media literacy skills. Generally, the majority of respondents (73%) reported high degrees of confidence in their ability to recognize fake news online when they see it. This finding is unsurprising, since we do expect people to often overestimate their own skills or abilities. However, as seen in the previous section, approximately 1 in 5 people consider that misinformation online is a pressing issue that is important to address. This indicates a de-prioritization of the harms of misinformation by the public despite it’s historical and ongoing implications.

Research has shown there is a “clear link between hate speech and the escalation of violent attacks against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in the country, which presaged the atrocities committed by security forces” (Morada, 2023). We saw this happen again with the massacre in Southern Shan State and how the military used “misinformation and hate speech in the aftermath” to inflame local ethno-religious tensions between the region’s Pa-O and Karenni ethnic groups (Klark & Sagun, 2023). Thus, susceptibility to misinformation continues to be a serious vulnerability for citizens that malicious actors can exploit. Consequently, it is important to validate how well people can actually identify fake or manipulated news. The first step to verify and improve digital media literacy skills is to understand what aspects of it people struggle with and then educate them about it.

To dig into this topic further, we asked respondents which actors they thought were responsible for the dissemination of fake news online. Approximately 35% of respondents attributed blame to SAC-run or affiliated media. Upon further analysis, those who blamed SAC-run or affiliated media for the dissemination of fake news were more likely to prioritize mental health, federalism and civil casualties as important topics for Myanmar’s future.

Which actors do you believe are responsible for the dissemination of fake news online?

Figure 19. Graph showing the % of respondents that believe specific actors are responsible for spreading fake news online.

Furthermore, it is surprising and concerning that citizens perceive Independent Burmese Media and civil society organizations as the second and third highest sources of fake news, at 30% and 20% respectively. While far from being the majority of respondents, these breakdowns in Figure 19 nonetheless signal significant levels of distrust or scepticism towards independent burmese media and CSOs.

Further analysis found that respondents who thought independent Burmese media were responsible for the dissemination of fake news were more likely to consider misinformation and federalism as important topics for discussion. Interestingly, women were more likely to assign blame to independent Burmese media than men, while people who perceived higher contribution from ethnic minorities were less likely to assign this source blame. These early findings should be investigated further through additional research.

Takeaways and Recommendations

The results of this research offer key insights that could be valuable to those looking to promote social cohesion in Myanmar. Over the past few years, we have observed gradual progress in tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities, as well as high degrees of support for minority rights amongst the Myanmar population. Our longitudinal survey findings suggest that the aftermath of the 2021 coup has created promising momentum for further development of social cohesion and tolerance in Myanmar.

While national support for democracy has been relatively high over the past few years, there is still a significant subset of the population that is sceptical or indifferent about the prospect of democratic governance. The underlying reasons for this merit further research, but one likely factor could be that certain subsets of the population have been historically under representation and underserved by previous governance systems. This indicates the need for policymakers and leaders to make data-driven and informed decisions to ensure they are representing the interests and needs of the country’s diverse constituents. It also emphasises the need to raise awareness and advance education about how democratic systems work and their value to citizens.

Engaging citizens effectively will allow awareness and education efforts to succeed. Social media continues to be the primary way through which people access information and news. However, it also amplifies the threat of misinformation on social cohesion and democracy. To advance online initiatives seeking to promote social cohesion and support for democratic processes, it is imperative to increase the population’s resilience to targeted or malignant mis/disinformation campaigns that seek to sow division, discord, or confusion amongst the public. Furthermore, in 2023 we observed seemingly high levels of distrust in Independent Burmese media and CSOs from the population, as a significant proportion of respondents believe that these actors are responsible for the dissemination of fake news online. This therefore suggests that efforts to boost digital media literacy and resilience to misinformation needs to be supported with parallel efforts to better understand the drivers of distrust towards these actors, and to address them.

Finally, as we see an environment in Myanmar where the push for positive change must continue, we should utilise the bustling online public space to educate about inclusivity and democracy by firstly ensuring that citizens are strengthening their media literacy skills and are staying safe online. Moreover, the access to reliable information about national issues, marginalised experiences and alternative forms of governance can build demand for more rights and inspire real-life change.

On the basis of these findings and takeaways, we recommend that CSOs and media actors collaborate on the following items:

DPS welcomes the opportunity to discuss these findings in greater detail. For more information about our work in Myanmar, please send us an email at events.connect@digitalpublicsquare.org.

Bibliography

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Ford & Ko Ko. “To Build a Unified Resistance and Democratic Myanmar, Discrimination Must End.” United States Institute of Peace. September 8 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/build-unified-resistance-and-democratic-myanmar-discrimination-must-end

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Klark & Sagun. “Misinformation, Hate Speech and Ethno-Religious Tensions in Myanmar”. United States Institute of Peace. April 27 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/misinformation-hate-speech-and-ethno-religious-tensions-myanmar

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